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THE AFTERMATH OF CERTAIN KEY
FEDERAL TAX CASES DECIDED
BY THE COURTS*
LEST e R. URETZ**
Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service
The Office of the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service' con-
tributes to the development of the Federal tax laws by the exercise of its
legislative, interpretative, and litigating functions. These three functions
are illustrated by the aftermath of four recent Supreme Court cases in
which the Government was on the losing side-Commissioner v. Brown,
Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, Malat v. Riddell, and
Commissioner v. Tellier.
2
Each time a decision adverse to the Government is handed down by the
Supreme Court, the Internal Revenue Service, acting in conjunction with
the Tax Division of the Justice Department and the Office of the Tax
Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Department, must analyze the opin-
ion of the Court and decide upon a course of action to be taken. The
Service must determine-
What is the scope of the decision?
Is the scope of the decision clear?
If the scope of the decision is not clear, should a Technical Information
Release or other announcement be issued setting forth the Service's inter-
pretation of the decision?
Should legislation be sought, and, if so, what form should it take?
Should the regulations be amended?
Should published revenue rulings be modified?
Is further litigation necessary to delineate the state of law in the area?
The role of the Chief Counsel's Office in resolving these questions and
*This paper was presented at the William and Mary Twelfth Annual Tax Con-
ference on December 3, 1966. By consent of all concerned it has been adapted for
publication in the Journal of Taxation, 26 JTAX-(April 1967).
**The author expresses his appreciation for the aid in preparing this paper pro-
vided by Gerald Brown, Branch Chief, Legislation and Regulations Division.
1. For a general discussion of the Office of the Chief Counsel for the Internal
Revenue Service see Treusch, Chief Counsel's Office: A Dynamic View of Its
Organization and Procedures: The "Hows" and Something of the "Whys", 12th
Annual So. Calif, Tax Institute 19 (1960); Spiegel, Current Operations in the
Chief Counsel's Office, 38 Taxes 905 (Dec. 1960); Cohen, The Chief Counsel's
Office, 42 Taxes 191 (Mar. 1964); Cohen, Current Developments in the Chief
Counsel's Office, 42 Taxes 663 (Oct. 1964); Rogovin, Current Developments in
the Chief Counsel's Office, Bulletin of Section of Taxation, A.B.A. 36 (Oct. 1965).
2. 380 U.S. 563 (1965); 383 U.S. 272 (1966); 383 U.S. 569 (1966); 383
U.S. 687 (1966).
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in carrying out a course of action is graphically illustrated by the Office's
activities in the wake of Clay Brown, Fribourg, Malat, and Tellier. The
purpose of this article is not to examine the substantive ramifications of
these decisions, but instead to review them in order to demonstrate that
each case prompted a different response by the Government and that
each case called for the performance by the Chief Counsel's Office of one
of its three basic functions.
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
The Clay Brown case illustrates the legislative function of the Chief
Counsel's Office. In Clay Brown, a charitable organization claiming tax
exemption8 acquired the stock of a lumber company by agreeing to pay
the former stockholders of the lumber company a stated percentage of its
future earnings until the sales price had been paid. The tax-exempt or-
ganization made no commitment for payment of the sales price other than
from the assets of the lumber business or the earnings produced by the
business. The sales contract provided that simultaneously with the transfer
of the stock of the lumber company the tax-exempt organization would
liquidate the lumber company and lease its assets to a new corporation
owned by the selling stockholders' attorneys for a period of 5 years. Clay
Brown, the principal stockholder, was given a management contract to
operate the lumber business.
The lease provided that the new corporation, owned by the seller's at-
torneys, would pay 80 percent of its earnings, computed before an al-
lowance for depreciation, to the tax-exempt organization as rent. Since
the earnings derived by the new corporation largely were offset by the
so-called rental payments to the exempt organization, the new corporation
paid little or no tax. On the other hand, the tax-exempt organization did
not include the so-called rental payments in its income because of its tax
exemption. Although a tax is imposed by the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 on the unrelated business income of charitable organizations,4 there
is an exception for rents from leases of real property for 5 years or less.5
The issue in the Clay Brown case was whether the selling stockholders'
gain on the sales transaction was capital gain or whether the payments to
them out of the earnings of the lumber business represented operating
profits taxable at ordinary income rates.6 The Government contended that
a sale had not taken place since the risks of the transaction had remained
3. The possible tax consequences to a charitable organization of engaging in
bootstrap transactions were stated in Rev. Rul. 54-420, C.B. 1954-2, 128.
4. Section 511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Hereafter all section
citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
5. Section 512 (b) (3) and (4)
6. 380 U.S. at 568.
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with the sellers and the exempt organization promised only to pay over a
percentage of the lumber business' future earnings. However, the Supreme
Court in rejecting this argument held that the transaction was a sale and
that as a result the former stockholders were entitled to report their gain
on the transaction at capital gain rates.7 The majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in the Clay Brown case referred to it as an area for
Congressional action.'
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, Chairman Mills and Rep-
resentative Byrnes of the House Ways and Means Committee requested
that a study of bootstrap transactions be conducted by the staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the Congress and by
the Treasury Department.9 The Legislation and Regulations Division of
the Chief Counsel's Office participated in this study as the Internal Rev-
enue Service's representative. The Division engaged in research to deter-
mine the various types of bootstrap transactions and the parties thereto. In
addition, it coordinated field surveys in order to determine the frequency
and types of transactions that were actually being engaged in by taxpayers.
The research and surveys were essential in order to determine the scope
of any proposed legislation and the parties that should be affected by such
legislation. The Treasury Department enlisted the help of outside tax
consultants. Also, conferences were held with representatives of the Sec-
tion of Taxation of the American Bar Association in order to obtain their
views.
The study of bootstrap transactions with a view towards drafting cor-
rective legislation raised several policy questions. First, should the legisla-
tion be aimed at the sellers, the buyer, or the rental corporation? Second,
should the legislation affect only bootstrap transactions engaged in by
tax-exempt organizations, and, if limited to tax-exempt organizations,
should it further be limited to Clay Brown-type transactions?
As a result of this study, Congressmen Mills and Byrnes introduced
identical bills in the 89th Congress which would impose a tax on the
unrelated debt-financed income of tax-exempt organizations.10 One of the
elements of the plan in Clay Brown was the shelter from tax provided by
the tax exemption of the purchasing tax-exempt organization. These bills
would render the profits of the business taxable to the charity where the
business is unrelated to the exempt purpose of the organization and the
7. 380 U.S. at 570. The Tax Court [37 T.C. 461 (1961)] held that the gain
was taxable at capital gains rates. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals [325 F. 2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963)].
8. 380 U.S. at 579, 580, and 588.
9. Committee on Ways and Means, Press Release, Aug. 27, 1965.
10. H.R. 15942 and H.R. 15943, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See Committee
on Ways and Means, Press Release, June 27, 1966.
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income-producing property is purchased out of future earnings of the
business or otherwise acquired with borrowed funds."1 Enactment of this
legislation, on which public hearings were held,' 2 would greatly inhibit
the use of the Clay Brown-type device. In anticipation that similar bills
will be introduced in the 90th Congress, the Legislation and Regulations
Division is now studying the bills introduced in the 89th Congress to de-
termine whether they provide the intended solutions for all known prob-
lems. In addition, it is considering the testimony presented at the public
hearings and all other comments and suggestions received by the Treasury
Department.
Acting on behalf of the Commissioner, the Legislation and Regulations
Division of the Chief Counsel's Office exercised its legislative function by
participating in the Joint Committee's study and by assisting in the devel-
opment and drafting of the two bills.
INTERPRETATIVE FUNCTION
The Fribourg case illustrates the interpretative function of the Chief
Counsel's Office. Fribourg involved the deductibility of depreciation in
the year of sale. During the late 1950's, the Internal Revenue Service be-
came concerned that in some instances taxpayers were securing excessive
depreciation deductions by under estimating salvage value of depreciable
assets. After an extensive study of the problem, it was concluded that
where depreciable property was sold or exchanged at a gain, for the year
of sale salvage value should be adjusted upward to reflect the sales price.
Accordingly, the depreciation deduction for the year of sale would be
limited to the amount, if any, by which the adjusted basis of the property
at the beginning of the year exceeded the sales price. The position was
announced to the public' s and advanced in the courts.
Rev. Rul. 62-92 indicates that this position is based on the view that
the longstanding regulatory provisions providing that the salvage value
which was determined at the time of acquisition would not be disturbed
11. The Clay Brown case left unresolved several problems which would not
be solved by the proposed legislation and which call for the exercise of the
litigating function of the Chief Counsel's Office. First, there is the question of
whether the payments made by the leasing corporation are rent or a share of
the profits; if the latter, there obviously would be no rental deduction. Second,
if the payments are not rent, the exception from the unrelated business tax for
rental payments is not applicable. Finally, to what extent may charitable or-
ganizations engage in Clay Brown-type transactions and still retain their tax
exemption. Some of these questions are presently being litigated.
12. See, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 15942,
and H.R. 15943, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 29, 1966).
13. Technical Information Release 384, June 7, 1962; Rev. Rul. 62-92, C.B.
1962-1, 29.
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applied only to assets still in the hands of the taxpayer. It was reasoned
that the regulatory provisions were designed to eliminate "needless and
endless controversies" over estimated salvage value, but upon sale or ex-
change of an asset, it is reasonable and proper to take the ultimate facts
into consideration in determining the depreciation deduction for the year
of disposition. This position with respect to adjustment of salvage value
was accepted by some lower courts,' and rejected by others.1 5
In Fribourg the Government's position was accepted by both the Tax
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 6 Fribourg in-
volved the sale of a used liberty ship for an amount in excess of its esti-
mated salvage value. Prior to the taxpayer's acquisition of the ship, it had
obtained a letter ruling with respect to the useful life of the asset and its
salvage value. Due to abnormal market conditions occasioned by hostilities
in the Suez Canal area, the taxpayer was able to sell the ship after about
two years of service for an amount substantially in excess of the estimated
salvage value.' 7 For the year of sale the Service disallowed the entire de-
preciation deduction with respect to the ship since the amount realized
from the sale of the ship exceeded its adjusted basis at the beginning of
the year, and, therefore, the use of the ship during the year of sale "cost
the taxpayer nothing."
Due to the importance of the question, the heavy litigation, and con-
flicts between the courts of appeals on the issue, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari."8 The Court decided in favor of the taxpayer holding that
the depreciation deduction was erroneously disallowed.' 9
Almost immediately after the Supreme Court decision, questions began
to arise with respect to the scope of the decision. In certain quarters there
14. Cohn v. United States, 259 F. 2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958); Motorlease Cor-
poration v. United States, 334 F. 2d 617 (2nd Cir. 1964), reversing 215 F. Supp.
356 (D. Conn. 1963); Killebrew v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Tenn.
1964).
15. E.g., United States v. S & A Co., 218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn. 1963),
af'd 338 F. 2d 629 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 383 U.S. 942 (1966) ; Occidental
Loan Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Calif. 1964); Macabe Co.,
42 T.C. 1105 (1964); Harry Trotz, 43 T. C. 127 (1964), rev'd on other grounds
361 F. 2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966); Holder Driv-Ur-Self, Inc., 43 T.C. 202 (1964)
(Nonacq. C.B. 1965-2, 7).
16. T.C. Memo. 1962-290; 335 F. 2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1964).
17. The estimated salvage value and useful life of the vessel were 3 years and
$54,000. The actual sale price of the ship was $695,500. Shortly after the sale,
similar vessels were again being scrapped for amounts nearly identical to the
originally estimated salvage value of the ship.
18. 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
19. 383 U.S. 272 (1966). On March 21, 1966, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, in a per curiam opinion based on Fribourg, reversed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Motorlease Corporation. 383
U.S. 573 (1966).
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appeared to be a belief that Fribourg permitted a depreciation deduction
for the year of sale in all cases. The Interpretative Division, working in
conjunction with the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical),
devoted many man hours in analyzing and interpreting the Supreme Court
opinion and the decisions cited in the opinion. As a result of this intensive
study, it was concluded that the scope of the decision was much more
limited than some persons had originally believed.
In the Fribourg factual situation both the salvage value and the useful
life of the asset had been estimated with reasonable accuracy at the time
the ship was put in service. The Service had ruled on these points and
did not later question the original ruling. The Supreme Court emphasized
that, in Fribourg, the reason for the sale prior to the expiration of the
estimated useful life and at an amount in excess of the estimated salvage
value was an "unexpected and short-lived, but spectacular" change in
market conditions. The Court indicated that the Service had confounded
two concepts--depreciation of an asset through wear and tear or gradual
expiration of useful life, and fluctuation in the market value of an asset
through changes in price levels. It was apparent from the decision that
the Supreme Court did not in every case preclude adjustment of estimated
salvage value in the year of sale, but limited its decision to situations
where the original estimates were admittedly reasonable and later proved
to be accurate. 20 The Service, therefore, concluded that the salvage value
of an asset could be adjusted and the depreciation for the year of sale
accordingly disallowed, in whole or part, where the taxpayer failed to
assign a salvage value to property or where the salvage value assigned
was inadequate.
At the time of the Fribourg decision a number of cases containing
similar issues were pending. The Tax Court and Refund Litigation Divi-
sions and the various field offices of the Chief Counsel's Office were, of
course, obliged to review these cases and, taking into account the Service's
interpretation of the opinion, decide which issues were controlled by
Fribourg and should, accordingly, be conceded.2 1 In a similar manner,
20. The Court stated:
"It is, of course, undisputed that the Commissioner may require redetermina-
tion of useful life or salvage value when it becomes apparent that either of
these factors has been miscalculated. The fact of sale of an asset at an amount
greater than its depreciated basis may be evidence of such a miscalculation. * *
But the fact alone of sale above adjusted basis does not establish an error in
allocation. * * *
"4 * * Since the original estimates here were admittedly reasonable and
proved to be accurate, there is no ground for disallowance of depreciation." 383
U.S. at p. 277.
21. See Catherine F. Dinkins, 45 T.C. 593 (1966) (which was decided after
Fribourg) in which the service argued that part of the depreciation deduction
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the Service has had to take account of Fribourg in its handling of cases
which are in a pre-litigation stage.
The Interpretative Division of the Chief Counsel's Office, exercising
its interpretative function, assisted in determining the scope of the decision
and is now participating, in conjunction with the Income Tax Division
of the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical), in an intensive
study to determine the necessity of revoking or modifying any published
rulings which may be construed as being in conflict with the Fribourg
decision.
LITIGATING FUNCTION
The Malat case illustrates the litigating function of the Chief Counsel's
Office. In Malat, the Supreme Court dealt with the problem of whether
certain real estate was a capital asset or whether it came within the ex-
ception for "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business".2 2 Malat concerned a sale
of real estate by a taxpayer who was in the business of selling real estate.
Previously, the Government had argued with success that the legislative
purpose of section 1221 required that a sale by a taxpayer in the ordinary
course of his trade or business should result in ordinary income if a "sub-
stantial" or "essential" reason for the holding of the property was for
sale.23 The Supreme Court, however, in Malat rejected that argument and
concluded that the "principal" purpose or purpose "of first importance"
claimed in the year property was sold was not allowable because of an inaccurate
estimate of useful life and salvage value and another portion was not allowable be-
cause it would reduce the adjusted basis of the property below the sales price. The
Tax Court held for the Government to the extent that the disallowance was based
on the redetermination of useful life and salvage value, but held that the Supreme
Court decision in Fribourg governed the depreciation which was disallowed
merely because it would reduce the adjusted basis below the actual sale price.
22. Section 1221 states, in part, that * * * "the term 'capital asset' means
property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or
business), but does not include-
"(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close
of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business * * *"
23. See Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951);
Greene-Haldeman v. Commissioner, 282 F. 2d 884 (9th Cir. 1960); American
Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F. 2d 604 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S.
993 (1964); S.E.C. Corp. v. U.S. 140 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. N.Y. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 241 F. 2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1957), cert. denied 354 U.S. 909 (1957);
Harrah v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1236 (1958). Contra, Municipal Bond Corp.
v. Commissioner, 341 F. 2d 683 (8th Cir. 1965); Bennett v. Commissioner, 186
F. 2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951).
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must be for sale. The extent to which the Court broadened the definition
of a capital asset is quite unclear.
In Malat, the taxpayer was a participant in a joint venture which had
been organized for the purpose of purchasing a parcel of land.2' The joint
venture apparently had three different purposes in mind with respect to
the property. One of the possibilities was construction of a garden type
apartment development on the entire parcel. However, because the mort-
gage market was unfavorable the development was not constructed. The
partners also considered constructing apartment buildings on the inner
portion of the parcel, retaining the outer portion for commercial use.
However, this required rezoning of the outer portion which could not be
obtained. The taxpayer testified that the partners thought when they
purchased the property that they had made a good purchase and if they
could not obtain acceptable construction financing or rezoning, they could
always sell the property. Finally, the inner portion of the parcel, after be-
ing subdivided and improved, was sold. The partners recognized ordinary
income. The partners still explored the possibility of commercial develop.
ment of the outside portion. However, after a disagreement arose among
the partners, some of the partners, including the taxpayer, decided to
terminate the joint venture. Accordingly, part of the property was sold to
a new partnership, consisting of those partners who wished to retain their
interest in the property, and the rest of the property was sold to a real
estate developer. The Government argued that the real estate was held
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of that business. The Govern-
ment cited many court opinions which, when faced with a dual purpose
holding, concluded that if an "essential" or "substantial" purpose was to
sell, then the property was held "primarily for sale". 2" Taxpayers con-
tended that they had intended to develop the property for rental and
that the eventual sale was only a termination of the investment because
development was not feasible.
The District Court applied the rule stated by the 9th Circuit in Rolling-
wood Corp. v. Commissioner26 that a taxpayer who intends to rent or sell
24. The facts as presented are in accord with the findings of the District Court
on remand from the Supreme Court [66-2 USTC 19564 (S.D. Cal.] and gen-
emily in accord with the statements of the Court of Appeals [347 F. 2d 23 (9th
Cir. 1965)] and the Supreme Court. There being some confusion among thejoint venturers regarding the intended use of the land, the various statements of
the facts are not in all respects identical.
25. Supra note 23.
26. 64-1 USTC §9432 (S.D. Cal.) In Rollingwood, 190 F. 2d 263 (9th Cir.
1951), the taxpayer corporation was organized in 1943 by an individual, who
was in the business of constructing homes and subdividing and selling real
estate, to construct and manage a war housing project. In conformity with
the policy of the United States to provide low cost rental housing, these houses
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real estate depending on which course appears to be most profitable must
recognize ordinary income if the real estate is sold. The Rollingwood case
stated that only an "essential" reason for the holding need be for sale.
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded holding that the wrong test was applied. The
Court stated that the word "primarily" should be interpreted in its every
day sense. This interpretation, the Court said, is consistent with the legis-
lative purpose to distinguish between the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a period of time, and profits and losses arising from
the everyday operation of a business.27
The Malat decision dealt with standards to be applied to the basic
factual determination of whether property is held primarily for sale in the
ordinary course of a trade or business. This is an area where the Service
does not ordinarily issue rulings but where many disputes arise after the
property is sold.28 After the Malat decision was handed down the Chief
Counsel's Office R.I.R.A. data2 9 indicated that, under section 1221 alone,
were advertised for rent and were all rented. The houses were rented for an
average time of 22 months, but by 1947, almost all of the 700 houses constructed
had been sold. The Tax Court held-that the houses were held by the corpora-
tion primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals found that the issue
was whether the property was held primarily for sale or primarily for rent. The
Court stated that a definition of "primarily" as "essentially" or "substantially"
was more consistent with the purpose of Congress, which was to tax at ordinary
income tax rates gain on the sale of property bought and sold for a profit, but
at capital gains rates gain on the sale of investment property. Accordingly, since
an "essential" or "substantial" reason for the construction and holding of the
houses in this case was for their sale, the Court held that the profits on the sales
should be taxed as ordinary income.
27. The pertinent part of the opinion states that-
"As we have often said, 'the words of statutes-including revenue acts-should
be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.' * * * Departure
from a literal reading of statutory language may, on occasion, be indicated by
relevant internal evidence of the statute itself and necessary in order to effect
the legislative purpose. * * * But this is not such an occasion. The purpose of the
statutory provision with which we deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and
losses arising from the everyday operation of a business' on the one hand * * *
and 'the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of
time' on the other. * * * A literal reading of the statute is consistent with this
legislative purpose. We hold that, as used in §1221(1), 'primarily' means 'of
first importance' or 'principally'." 383 U.S. at 571-572.
28. Rev. Proc. 64-31, C.B. 1964-2, 947.
29. The Reports and Information Retrieval Activity, among other things,
gathers data relating to the workload of the Chief Counsel's Office. See Link,
RIRA-A Legal Information System in the Internal Revenue Service, 43 Taxes
231 (1965).
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159 groups of cases pending involved this issue. Accordingly, a study
group was established to consider the impact of the decision on existing
precedents and the many pending cases. Representatives of the Justice De-
partment and the Chief Counsel's Office made a thorough review of the
law in this area. Moreover, the language involved appears in many other
Code sections. s0 The immediate impact of the decision was to broaden the
circumstances under which a dealer in real property could obtain capital
gains on a sale of that type of property.
However, more disturbing was the fact that the Supreme Court's opin-
ion left many unanswered questions. After a review of the decision, it
became apparent that the scope and meaning of the Court's decision could
only be determined in the course of further litigation."' A function of the
Refund Litigation and Tax Court Divisions of the Chief Counsel's Office
is to assure that a uniform litigation position is adopted. With respect to
routine cases, we knew that our position in all the pending cases would be
uniform and consistent. However, it was intended that special attention
be given to the particularly troublesome cases.
Since Malat, a number of decisions have been rendered amplifying the
rule that the Supreme Court laid down. For example, in S. 0. Bynum,3'
a Tax Court case, the property involved was part of a farm leased by the
taxpayers in 1936 and purchased in 1942. The taxpayers lived on the
farm and maintained a nursery and landscape business on it. In late 1959,
because they were under pressure to amortize or reduce a mortgage on
the land, the taxpayers began to subdivide and improve a portion of the
farm. In 1960 and 1961, the activities conducted by them in connection
with the sale of the subdivided lots were so substantial as to constitute a
trade or business. The opinion, which was reviewed by the entire Tax
Court, noted that, unlike Malat which involved a dual purpose holding,
30. E.g., sections 337, 341, 1231, and 1236.
31. The specific problems left unresolved by the Malat decision were numerous.
For example, it was not clear what the result would be if a taxpayer who sold
property had a number of motives for holding the property and only one was to
hold for sale. Must the sale motive outweigh the sum of all the other motives
or only be more significant than any other single motive? It also was not clear
if the sale motive had to be only slightly more significant than the other motive
or motives or if it had to be substantially more significant. It also was not clear
whether a taxpayer who manufacturers products for sale or rent could treat
profits with respect to its sales as capital gains. With respect to existing prece-
dents, it was not clear what the effect of the decision would be on the change
of purpose rule. That rule, generally stated, is that ordinary income is recog-
nized when property is sold by a taxpayer who when he originally purchased the
property did not intend to engage in the business of selling such property but
who at a later date changed his intentions, engaged in such a business, and held
the property for sale in that business.
32. 46 T.C. 295 (1966).
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this case involved a change of purpose. The Tax Court went on to state
that while "the taxpayers' purpose at the time of acquisition has evi-
dentiary weight,... the end question is the purpose of the 'holding' at the
time of the sale or sales." Accordingly, the taxpayers were required to re-
port ordinary income in connection with these sales. 8 Other post-Malat
cases also have applied the change of purpose rule although not always
in the Service's favor." In a concurring opinion in Bynum, Judge Tan-
nenwald, with three other judges agreeing, further expounded on the basis
of the Tax Court's decision. Among other things, he stated that the sale
motive does not "have to be capable of a quantitative measurement of
more than 50 percent" but it need only be "primus inter pares"."s A num-
ber of other decisions have been rendered by the Tax Court and the Court
of Claims since Malat. They seem to indicate that perhaps the new test
will not significantly change the outcome of cases involving dual purpose
holdings.3 6
In the trial of these cases, the Tax Court and Refund Litigation Divi-
sions, and the various field offices of the Chief Counsel's Office were
faced with a situation where the law was unclear. It was the Office's re-
sponsibility to attempt to bring uniformity and clarity to this area. The
litigating divisions, by assisting in the trial of the cases and by working
together to develop a uniform policy, have contributed to the clearing
up of some of the problems created by the Malat decision.
33. It is interesting to note the concurring opinion of Judge Tanenwald in
this connection. He states that in many change of purpose cases, part of the
profit is attributable to appreciation in value during the period the property was
held for investment, and part results from the operation of the business. There-
fore, he suggests that "perhaps some method of allocation within an appropriate
statutory framework is indicated." 46 T.C. at 302.
34. For example, in Tibbals v. United States, 362 F. 2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966), the
Court of Claims held that two of three sales by taxpayer of subdivided land re-
sulted in ordinary income but that the third sale resulted in capital gains.
However, the Court, after recognizing that a taxpayer's purpose can change
and that the dominant purpose during the period prior to sale is critical, found
that by the time the final sale was made taxpayer held the property as an
investment and his financial interest was in "the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a substantial period of time." In J. Thomas Requard, T.C.
Memo 1966-141, the Tax Court held that the gain realized from a transfer of
an interest in a partnership and attributable to certain real estate which had
appreciated substantially in value was ordinary income.
35. 46 T.C. at 302.
36. See, e.g., Tibbals v. United States, supra note 34; Nadalin v. United States,
66-2 USTC §9548 (Ct. Cl.); J. Thomas Requard, supra note 34; Joan E. Heller
Trust, T.C. Memo. 1966-121; William A. Scheuber, T.C. Memo. 1966-107;
Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219 (1966); and see Comment, 64 Mich. L. Rev.
1610, 1613 (1966).
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SUMMARY OF THE THREE FUNCTIONS
The Tellier case, 87 because of the nature of the decision and its re-
versal of prior authority in the lower courts,3 8 illustrates the three basic
functions of the Chief Counsel's Office which contribute to the develop-
ment of the Federal tax laws.
In Tellier, contrary to numerous decisions and published rulings in the
past," the Court held deductible legal fees incurred in the unsuccessful
defense of a criminal prosecution arising out of the conduct of the tax-
payer's business. The Supreme Court's opinion extended, however, beyond
this specific holding into a discussion of the entire "frustration of public
policy" area.40
The Chief Counsel's Office exercised its interpretative function by
revising previously taken public positions with respect to the deductibility
of legal fees in criminal matters. The office exercised its litigating function
by examining its current litigating position with respect to other kinds of
cases usually considered to fall within the "public policy" area. In addi-
tion, a bill was introduced in the second session of the 89th Congress
which deals with certain aspects of the question of the denial of deduc-
tions from gross income because of the frustration of clearly defined public
policy.41 The bill was introduced as a result of a study conducted by the
Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation of the Con-
gress, which, in turn, was prompted by the Service's 1964 ruling concern.
ing the deduction of treble damage payments.42
The initial interpretative response is manifest in Revenue Ruling 66-
33041 which revokes and modifies previous rulings4" all of which dealt in
37. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), aff'ing 342 F. 2d 690 (2nd
Cir. 1965).
38. Tellier v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. Memo 1062 (1963).
39. See, inter alia, Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 178
(2nd Cir. 1931) ; Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. 2d 698 (2nd Cir. 1934);
C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417 (1951); Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956);
Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Peckham v. Commissioner,
327 F. 2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52.
40. Much has been written on this subject. See, for example, Note, Business
Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning with the
Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L. J. 108 (1962); Lindsay, Tax Deductions and
Public Policy, 41 Taxes 711 (1963); Diamond, The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of
Public Policy in Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions, 44 Taxes 803 (1966).
41. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Session (1966).
42. Staff of Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Study of Income
Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments Under the Antitrust Laws (Nov. 1,
1965); Rev. Rul. 64-224, C.B. 1964-2, 52.
43. I.R.B. 1966-45, 5.
44. I. T. 2303, V-2 C.B. 38 (1926); Rev. Rul. 62-175, C.B. 1962-2, 50; Rev.
Rul. 64-224, C.B. 1964-2, 52.
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one way or another with the issue of the deductibility of legal fees in
criminal matters. This response to what is the clear holding of the Tellier
case was of course compelled by the decision itself. However, the language
of the opinion with respect to other matters in the public policy area is
not nearly so clear and compelling. Accordingly, the interpretative func-
tion of the Chief Counsel's Office must additionally be exercised in ex-
ploring and coordinating the thrust of the opinion into other related
areas, such as fines and penalties, bribes and kickbacks, treble damages
under the anti-trust laws, and indeed in all of the areas which in the last
40 years have involved the issue of frustration of public policy when tax-
payers have made business-related payments. This exercise of our inter-
pretative function is, of course, not limited to reevaluation of past pub-
lished ruling positions. It necessarily also involves determinations with
respect to pending litigation. At this very moment, we are involved in
this task.
We must act upon the assumption that bills similar to the bill intro-
duced in the 89th Congress will be introduced in the 90th Congress. This
means that the Legislation and Regulations Division must exercise the
legislative function by engaging in an examination of any legislation which
is proposed in order that it may be ready, when the occasion arises, to
effectively represent the Service. In this activity, of course, the operation
of the Chief Counsel's Office must be coordinated with the similar activity
in the Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel.
The exercise of the three basic functions of the Chief Counsel's Office-
legislative, interpretative, and litigating-will ultimately result in a com-
prehensive Service position.

